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NOTES
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BAKER V. CARR FOR INDIANA
Until recently federal jurists felt themselves precluded from de-
termining whether systems of legislative apportionment were violative
of federal constitutional guarantees. Heeding the admonition of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green1 that such controversies were
of a "peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial de-
termination,"2 federal courts in the sixteen years following Colegrove
denied relief to those seeking the rectification of malapportioned state
legislatures at least in part upon the grounds of non-justiciability or want
of equity.' The District Court for Southern Indiana has been no exception
to those courts which have exercised judicial restraint in this area for it
has held the question of legislative apportionment to be a purely political
matter and cautioned that "the Federal sovereignty must not and shall
not invade this bulwark of State sovereignty."' The United States
Supreme Court, however, by its decision in Baker v. Carr" has dispelled
the notion that state legislative apportionment systems are immune from
judicial review and thereby paved the way for the breach of this here-
tofore impregnable "bulwark of State sovereignty."
There can be no doubt that the impact of the Baker decision will
not be lightly felt in states such as Indiana where the legislature has for
a number of years defaulted in its constitutional duty to reapportion, nor
in those states where practical politics call for the challenging of appor-
tionment formula which, though obeyed both in form and fact by the
legislature, result in a continued numerical underrepresentation of the
state's urban areas. Indeed, shortly after announcement of the decision
some thirty-one law suits in twenty-five states were pending before local
and federal tribunals.6 Reverberations are being presently felt in Indiana
as it is perceived that Baker could be the basis for a complete overhaul of
that state's representative system.
1. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
2. Id. at 552.
3. See note 11 infra.
4. Matthews v. Handley, 179 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Ind. 1959), aff'd, 361 U.S. 127
(1959).
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. For a summary of those states facing apportionment hassels see, Ingalls, Reappor-
tioning by 25 States is Foreseen by End of Next Year, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1962, p. 18,
col. 3; Robinson, 22 States Battle on Redistricting, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 23, col. 1.
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THE BAKER DECISION
In Baker citizen-voters of Tennessee assailed the failure of the
state legislature to reapportion since 1901 according to the mandate of its
constitution, declaring that shifts in population since that date had resulted
in legislative representation that reflected anything but adherence to the
Tennessee constitution's command of voter equality.7 The plaintiffs
contended that this "silent gerrymander" resulted in a debasement of
their vote which denied them the equal protection of the laws. Although
the plaintiffs were unable to convince the lower federal court that either
the Colegrove decision was inapposite or that its logic should no longer
prevent federal courts from intervening in state concerns where federally
guaranteed rights were being trammeled,' a divided Supreme Court lent
a more sympathetic ear to their urgings. The high Court reversed the
lower tribunal's dismissal by a six-to-two decision, holding that federal
courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of such suits, that the
plaintiffs suffered a personal injury which entitled them to standing, and
that state apportionment controversies present a justiciable claim.'
The immediate significance of the Baker decision was the determina-
7. TE.NN. CoNsT. art 3, §§ 3-6. The Tennessee constitution requires, with minor
exceptions, that both houses of the legislature be apportioned according to the number
of qualified voters. The plaintiff's statistics showed that thirty-seven per cent of the
state's voters controlled twenty of the thirty-three senate seats, while forty per cent could
elect sixty-three of the ninety-nine representatives. Moreover, a vote for senator in the
overrepresented areas was more than twice as effective as that in the most populous
district, and a vote for a representative eighteen times more effective.
8. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). The lower court's grounds
for dismissal were as follows: "[T]he federal courts, whether from a lack of jurisdiction
or from the inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration, will not
intervene in cases of this type to compel legislative reapportionment." Id. at 826. The
reasoning of the court is inconsistent. The former ground precludes adjudication on the
merits of a suit, while the latter is a dismissal on the merits. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682 (1946).
9. 369 U.S. at 197-198.
The Court swiftly cleared the jurisdiction and standing hurdles. Mr. Justice Brennan
held that the federal judiciary had jurisdiction because the suit involved a question
arising under the Constitution. That is, a violation of the equal protection clause was
asserted which did not appear insubstantial or devoid of merit. Moreover, Congress
has granted federal courts original jurisdiction over such matters in 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3).
That section provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . to redress the deprivation,
under color of any State law, statute, ordinance regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution.. .. ))
The Justices did not agree that a dilution of an elector's vote was a substantial
injury that would entitle him to standing in court. Mr. Justice Brennan determined that
a majority in Colegrove had expressly held that one who complains of malapportionment,
alleging an unequal vis-i-vis that of other electors in the state, had standing to sue,
and doubted that even Mr. Justice Frankfurter opined otherwise. But Frankfurter did not
share that belief as he makes clear in his vigorous dissent, for he found no substantial
injury in the dilution of one's vote, but only a deprivation of his "proportionate share
of political influence." Id. at 299.
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tion by the Court that suits attacking a state's legislative apportionment
system are justiciable, or stated in another manner, do not present a
"political question." Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, reviewed
many cases that had come before the Court where the "political question"
doctrine had been invoked. From these he determined that such questions
only arise when (1) co-equal branches of the federal government are
involved (the situation present in Colegrove where the issue of con-
gressional apportionment was before the federal judiciary), and (2) when
the controversy contains certain elements which render it incapable of
judicial determination.1" A majority of the Court concluded that the
relief sought in the instant case ran afoul of neither of the above snares
and that prior suits had not conclusively adjudicated the nonjusticiability
of malapportionment controversies.1 Mr. Justice Frankfurter disagreed
10. Mr. Justice Brennan stated that "[I]n . . . 'political question' cases, it is the
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Govern-
ment, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the
'political question'." Id. at 210.
The elements Mr. Justice Brennan warned of were the following:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
11. Mr. Justice Brennan's attempt to establish the justiciability of apportionment
suits seems to collapse when he tries to demonstrate that none of the apportionment
cases following Colegrove have been dismissed by the court for nonjusticiability. These
per curiam decisions and the reasons Brennan cites for their dismissal are: Cook v.
Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946), mootness; Thurman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946),
mootness; MacDougal v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), want of equity. Brennan does not
explain why the court in dismissing the MacDougal case cited Colegrove, for the latter
case clearly was not dismissed for want of equity. Remmy v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1951),
action premature; Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958), time problem; South v.
Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), want of equity. Once again it must be asked, why was
Colegrove cited in the dismissal of this action when only one Justice who participated
in the decision, Mr. Justice Rutledge, had grounded his opinion on want of equity?
Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952), no election involved; Anderson v. Jordan, 342 U.S.
912 (1952), adequate state ground; Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U. S. 920 (1956), adequate
state remedies. Again the Supreme Court cited Colegrove, a case which in no manner
rested upon the existence of an adequate ground. Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1956),
relief problems; Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959), available state remedies.
While it is true that the lower court's decision in part rested upon the existence of
adequate state remedies, that court expressly based its decision in the main upon the
nonjusticiability of the claim. Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947), want of equity.
Mr. Justice Douglas clearly recognized the futility of attempting to rationalize the
above decisions on grounds other than that of nonjusticiability. As he put it, "With the
exceptions of Colegrove v. Green . . . MacDougal v. Green . . . South v. Peters . . .
and the decisions they spawned, the Court had never thought that protection of voting
rights was beyond judicial cognizance." 369 U. S. at 249-50.
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vehemently with the majority's determination of justiciability for he
thought that the question had been settled by Colegrove and the later per
curiam opinions.12 He urged that the plaintiffs were in actuality demand-
ing a declaration that a state must order its legislative representation on
the basis of population. In other words, he detected a masqueraded
Republican government guarantee case which he felt should be declared
nonjusticiable because of the judiciary's inability to choose between com-
peting theories of representative government. 3
The controversy raised by the Court's decision in Baker calls to
mind the public's similar reaction to its landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.4 Of course the two situations differ greatly, yet
through their spirit runs a line of noticeable similarity. In a long line of
cases prior to the Baker decision the Court had consistently, if not un-
equivocally, refused to become involved in the politics of apportionment.
In a like manner, until 1954 integration was an issue which the Court had
managed to sidestep by applying the well-worn separate-but-equal stan-
dard. But the Court eventually realized a need for its entry into these
fields when state officials failed to act in accordance with societal norms.
In both cases it was as though the Court felt duty bound to serve as the
country's conscience, and in discharging that duty it satisfied itself
initially with a vague, many-meaning decision. The Court seemed to be
saying in both cases that it would return to the subject many times in the
years ahead and would refrain in the first major case from saying
little more than that it had arrived.
When the Baker decision was announced commentators lamented
the Supreme Court's failure to provide specific standards by which a
state's apportionment system could be adjudged violative of constitutional
proscriptions." This criticism is not entirely justified. Merely by holding
that a suit attacking a state's failure to reapportion presents a justiciable
12. Id. at 297. Mr. Justice Harlan joined in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion.
13. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government. . . ." U.S. CoxsT. art. IV, § 4. The Court has never retreated
from its position taken in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), that claims under this
guarantee are nonjusticiable, but several commentators have found in Baker signs of a
weakening in this long-established view. Bonfield, Baker v. Carr, New Light on the
Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Govenmnent, 50 CAtiu. L. REv. 245 (1962).
Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 71-72 (1962).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See Lewis, Decision on Reapportionment Points Up Urban-Rural Struggle,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1962, § 4, p. 3, col. 5; Silva, Apportionment in New York, 30 FoRD-
RAu L. Rxv. 581 (1962). Since the completion of this Note the following commentators
have taken a similar position: Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15
VAND. L. REv. 829, 833, 834 (1962) ; McCloskey, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 54, 55, 74 (1962) ; Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Contitu-
tion, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1962).
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controversy within the meaning of the equal protection clause, there
necessarily results the applicability of those traditional standards by which
violations of that clause have been determined.1" It is clear that these
standards have been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court as applicable to
malapportionment controversies.
The Court's position on the legal standards applicable to the appor-
tionment problem can be approached negatively by inquiring what the
Court determined the equal protection clause does not require of such
systems. Nearly all the Justices participating in Baker affirmed the
traditional view that the equal protection clause does not require mathe-
matical equality in the application of state laws; apportionment systems
need not secure legislative representation on the basis of mathematical
voter equality."7 This statement could be interpreted to mean merely
that slight deviations from equality are not unconstitutional because more
is impossible to achieve when a state's political subdivisions are by state
constitution rendered indivisible for purposes of districting, and when
legislative district populations are in constant flux. But to say that this
was the Court's interpretation of non-mathematical exactness would be
to say at the same time that a state's system of apportionment must
reflect with substantial equality its voting population. It would, in short,
involve a choice between political theories of governmental representation
by requiring apportionment systems to be based upon population.
It is clear that the Court gave no such interpretation to the require-
ment of the equal protection clause. It did not imply that even significant
numerical disparities created by an apportionment system would ipso facto
render that system void. For it to fall within the pale of the equal
protection ban, not only must there be significant disparities in the voting
effectiveness of a state's electors, but such disparities must at the same
time be produced by an apportionment system that is arbitrary, 8 in-
vidious, 9 or irrational.2"
There is no real distinction to be drawn between results of state law
16. Since this conclusion was reached one court has expressly confirmed the truism.
"No guidelines or criteria are laid down [in Baker] for determining the extent or level
of disproportion necessary to constitute infringement of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the body of case law construing the Equal Protection
Clause applies." Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962).
17. 369 U.S. at 244-45, 258, 332, 334, 338. Also see Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 552 (1958), and cases cited therein.
18. 369 U.S. at 226, 336, 337. See Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
19. 369 U.S. at 244, 245, 253, 255, 344. The "invidious" standard has been fostered
by Mr. Justice Douglas, and first appeared in his decision in Skinner v. State ex. rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
20. 369 U.S. at 252, 253, 254, 256, 258, 334, 335, 337, 340, 341, 344, 345, 348.
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that are arbitrary, invidious or irrational, for these descriptive words are
all employed to convey the same notion: When a state law affects people
or objects differently there must be a reason for such discrimination.
The word "rationality" connotes this requirement of the equal protection
clause with greater clarity than do the other nonanalytical words employed
by jurists for that purpose, and it appears that the members of the
Supreme Court who participated in Baker favored this term. Every par-
ticipating Justice recognized that no state law could be deemed in violation
of the clause, regardless of the discrimination which resulted therefrom,
if that discrimination was based upon rational grounds."'
But when, it might be inquired, can an apportionment system which
produces inequality and discrimination be labeled rational and therefore
constitutional? Any pronouncement by members of the Court on this
matter was limited by the fact that the state advanced but one justification
for Tennessee's apportionment; that it balanced urban and rural interests.
Several Justices opined in Baker that an apportionment system which
effectuates a political balance between urban and rural areas is rational
even though such a system allots a greater or lesser proportion of repre-
sentation to such areas than they would be mathematically entitled to on a
population basis.22 But as Mr. Justice Clark pointed out, when an appor-
tionment produces not only vertical discrimination but horizontal dis-
crimination as well-that is when the representation of like as well as
unlike counties is unequal-then that system cannot be justified as a
rational weighting of urban and rural interests.23 This is but an affirma-
tion of the traditional requirement of the equal protection clause that per-
sons who are alike because similarly situated must be treated alike by
state law. 4 It may therefore be said that the Supreme Court has rejected
the notion that a substantial legal injury occurs to one whose vote is
diluted in effectiveness by a system of legislative apportionment. It has
determined rather, that only when such a dilution is irrational will an
elector be deemed to have suffered an injury sufficient to justify a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of that system.
POST BAKER CASES
Since Baker v. Carr was decided, state and lower federal courts have
taken to heart Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion that courts "do not have
accepted legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies to draw on
21. Ibid.
22. See note 49 infra and accompanying test.
23. 369 U.S. at 256.
24. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Skinner v. State ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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[in the apportionment area]," and have set forth to establish such stand-
ards.2" There have been numerous courts that have established as the
requirement of the equal protection clause that state apportionment
systems be based upon population. Such indeed is an acceptable standard
within the broad framework outlined by the Supreme Court. However,
in that these courts have construed Baker to require this result and this
result only, i.e., apportionment on the basis of population, they have
unnecessarily narrowed the scope of the Baker decision.
Very clearly an apportionment system based upon the population con-
cept is rational and therefore constitutional within the meaning of the
equal protection clause. Indeed, it might even be said that the population
basis immediately comes to one's mind as the most rational (if rationality
be measurable in degree) of any conceivable method of securing govern-
mental representation; under such a system all members of the voting
populous are accorded identical treatment. But surely few students of
political science would be willing to unequivocally assert that population
is the only rational means by which to order representation, and the
Supreme Court cannot be said to have reached such a position either
expressly or sub silentio in Baker. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has phrased
it with clarity:
Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary
complexity, involving-even after the fundamental theoretical
issues concerning what is to be represented in a representative
legislature have been fought out or compromised-considera-
tions of geography, demography, electoral convenience, eco-
nomic or social cohesions or divergencies among particular local
groups, communications, the practical effects of political institu-
tions like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and
ties of settled usage . . . mathematical mechanics, censuses
compiling relevant data, and a host of others."
When a court singles out a rational system of apportionment and
requires that a legislature be periodically reordered upon that basis and no
other, it has gone beyond the requirements of the equal protection clause
as postulated in the Baker decision. True, it may have selected for
implementation a rational plan, but it has at the same time precluded the
legislature or other appropriate state officer or body from considering
other rational schemes.
Because those courts which have required that a state be apportioned
25. 369 U.s. at 268.
26. Id. at 323.
NOTES
according to population in most instances did not expressly declare
adoption of this standard, it is necessary to consider each case at some
length to demonstrate how each did in fact write this new guarantee into
the equal protection clause.
Scholle v. Hare 2 7 was an action by a Michigan citizen-taxpayer to
have declared unconstitutional a 1952 amendment to the Michigan con-
stitution by which that state's senate districts were "frozen" in their then
existing status.2" When the supreme court of that state considered the
case on remand from the United States Supreme Court it determined that
the Michigan apportionment system embodied in the 1952 amendment
violated the equal protection of the law's guarantee. 9 The court declared
that any system of apportionment which produced legislative districts
with more than double the population of others would render that system
unconstitutional." That conclusion appears to have been reached solely
on the basis of Michigan precedent to the effect that any law which gives
some citizens twice the vote of others would be void as in violation of the
state requirement of apportionment on the basis of population."' But that
conclusion is imprecise. The court in fact declared that the two-to-one
27. 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), appeal docketed, No. 517, 31 U.S.L.
WEEx 3148 (1962).
28. MIcH. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 3.
29. When the Michigan court first considered the case they dismissed it upon
grounds of which no one is absolutely sure. 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), rev'd
per curiam 369 U.S. 429 (1962). A majority of the Supreme Court felt that the decision
had not rested upon the merits but rather upon the ground of nonjusticiability, so the
case was remanded for consideration in the light of Baker. Mr. Justice Harlan, however,
strongly felt that the state court's decision rested upon the merits, and he consequently
thought dismissal proper. Id. at 430.
30. The court declared as its maximal standard the following: "When a system of
legislative apportionment provides districts having more than double the population of
others, the constitutional range of discretion is violated." 116 N.W.2d at 355.
But that statement was extracted from the opinion of only two Judges, Kavanaugh
and Black, and there were three dissenters, Mr. Chief justice Carr, judge Dethmers, and
Judge Kelley. Judge Souris wrote the determining opinion, in which opinion judge Smith
concurred, and it is not altogether clear how that opinion should be interpreted. It is
conceded that Souris felt the present system irrational and for that reason in violation
of the equal protection clause. Id. at 381. But that was not the only ground of Souris'
decision for he said that even if the basis of the system was deemed rational it would
nonetheless violate the equal protection clause due to the disparities it produced. Souris
concluded by agreeing with judge Kavanaugh that the senate districts must "be arranged
in accordance with population.. . ." Id. at 382.
31. Id. at 354, 355. The Michigan court relied upon Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich.
1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892) and Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N.W. 749
(1906). It would seem impermissible for a state court to substitute its own fundamental
law for the guarantee of the equal protection clause, for if that proposition were uniform-
ly adopted the clause would mean something different in nearly all states. Three Justices
writing in Baker expressly repudiated the notion that the state constitutional apportion-
ment standard could double as the equal protection standard. 369 U.S. at 254, 325-26, 332.
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limitation was demanded not only by state law but by the equal protection
clause as well. 2
Admittedly the holding of the Michigan court does not imply that
mathematical exactness in any apportionment system is a requirement of
the clause. Nevertheless, when a court places a two-to-one ceiling upon
the disparity in district population which a system may produce it has in
essence held that the system must reflect population as its base. Perhaps
some will claim that such a conclusion entirely begs the question, arguing
that the Michigan court merely held that any system which dilutes the
voting effectiveness of a citizen to less than one-half of that enjoyed by
others is irrational. But such an argument does not bear analysis. The
two-to-one disparity ceiling was imposed not because the court found
that any system which created such inequality was irrational, but solely
because the court had in prior cases held that the state's own population
standard permitted inequality to that level. In short, the court held that
the members of both houses of the Michigan legislature must be appor-
tioned by population, a standard of representation that is satisfied when
no disparity in voting effectiveness greater than two-to-one exists. The
Scholle decision can best be characterized as a choice between competing
theories of democratic representation, a choice which Mr. Justice Frank-
furter warned courts would have to make on the basis of Baker.
A district court of Oklahoma in Moss v. Burkar" also established
population as their standard for determining whether a state apportion-
ment system violates the equal protection clause. This conclusion is not
evident from a cursory perusal of their decision. Indeed, in their determi-
nation to withold temporary relief the court declared that the traditional
and true test of a system's constitutionality was its rationality. "' Nearly
three months later the court made a "Further Statement of Facts and Law
on the Merits" at which time it declared adoption of the state constitutional
standard of population as its guide for determining malapportionment. "
Of course that alone would not have been tantamount to declaring voting
equality the guarantee of the equal protection clause had the court not
earlier admitted that the state formula could not be substituted for the
32. "And so we hold in final summation that the Fourteenth Amendment and our
own corresponding pledge of the protection of equal laws . . . do require that the
senatorial districts of Michigan be so arranged as to be consistent with the foregoing
maximum 2 to 1 ratio." Id. at 355-56.
33. 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962).
34. The court stated, "[Mere disparity is not enough.] An actionable deprivation
results only from an invidious discrimination-a disparity without rationality. . .
* * . The test to be applied is found in the Federal Constitution and . . . turns
on the rationality of the apportionment." Id. at 891.
35. OKLA. CoNsT. art V, §§ 9, 10.
NOTES
clause's guarantee.3" But once having determined that the state standard
could not delimit the federal proscription, later reliance on that formula
must lead one to conclude that the court considered the state and federal
guarantees commensurate.
7
In Sweeny v. Nottee"8 the Rhode Island Supreme Court felt called
upon to decide whether their state apportionment formula, which limited
the lower house of their assembly to one hundred members but granted
to each town and city one seat, was prohibited by the equal protection
clause.3" The court examined the case upon its merits and found that
adherence to the state constitutional formula presently did, and in the
future would, result in discrimination and inequality that was reflected
by population disparities between legislative districts. The court deter-
mined that such discrimination was invidious and therefore unjustified
by the system's rationality."0 This conclusion begs the question. The
court divorced the system's rationality from consideration and based its
determination of constitutionality solely upon the result produced by the
formula.4" In other words, it assumed as did the Michigan court in
Scholle that constitutionality is solely a question of percentages and
ratios rather than a broader question of rationality. The problem the
court should have grappled with is whether any system of rational
36. ". . [A] statutory apportionment which does comply with the State Con-
stitution, does not, ipso facto, afford the equal protection of the laws .. " 207 F. Supp.
at 891.
37. This conclusion finds basis in the court's language. After declaring that popu-
lation equality would be its standard for determining malapportionment it adds: "There
may be relevant counter-vailing factors, such as geography, economics, mass media
and functional or group voting strength. But none of these factors . . . can overcome
the basic principle underlying the right of an individual to cast an effective vote." Id. at
893. This surely is the equivalent of saying that the guarantee of the equal protection
clause in apportionment matters is representation on the basis of population. If the above
statement is not strong enough evidence of the court's position consider that made in the
per curiam dismissal of a motion to alter or amend the decree: "The Oklahoma Legisla-
ture will be reapportioned on the general principle of substantial numerical equality . . .
which is in consonance with the intent and spirit of . . . the equal protection
clause. . . ." Id. at 898.
38. 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962).
39. R.I. CoNsT., amend. 13, § 1. The plaintiff had actually leveled his attack
against Rhode Island's apportionment statute. The lower court, however, felt it would be
an "inexcusable dereliction of judicial responsibility" if it were only to consider the
statute when the constitutional formula itself might be invalid. Id. at 300.
40. Id. at 301. The court found that there were population disparities between
legislative districts as great as 22 to 1, but that the system generally resulted in a vote
debasement of 4 to 1.
41. There are certainly instances where the constitutionality of an apportionment
system will turn upon its result. For example, in the Baker case it will be recalled
that Tennessee's only asserted justification for its apportionment system was that it
resulted in a balancing of urban-rural interests. Faced with such an assertion a court
will be compelled to inquire into the results of the system to ascertain whether the effect
declaredly produced does in fact exist.
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apportionment, as the court concluded Rhode Island's to be, could ever
produce results which were invidious and therefore unconstitutional. By
assuming this proposition the court necessarily held that any apportion-
ment system must be substantially based upon population.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Levitt v. Maynard,42 while it
has yet to declare that the equal protection clause is violated by apportion-
ment systems not based upon population, has strongly suggested that in the
proper case it would so hold. In the earlier case of Levitt v. Attorney Gen-
eral,4" the same court based its dismissal of an apportionment suit solely on
the ground that the assailed system was rational." When the second suit
arose attacking the constitutional formula for the apportionment of the
senate, that system being that senatorial districts are drawn according to the
proportion of direct taxes paid by their inhabitants, the court again held
that the system rested upon a rational basis.4" The court, however, pro-
ceeded to demonstrate how the urban areas of the state were numerically
underrepresented by the system and, somewhat conversely, how the rural
elements of the state were not significantly overrepresented." In the first
case the court did not examine the results of a declaredly rational system.
But in the later decision it altered its standard for determining malappor-
tionment for it there required both that the system be rational and that it
produce a representation atune with concepts of voter equality."' The strong
implication of the court's language was that if a system resulted in sub-
stantial population disparity between even unlike legislative districts it
would violate the equal protection clause.
The above courts have deviated from the standards that courts have
traditionally used to determine violations of the equal protection clause
by holding that apportionment systems must be based upon population."8
42. 182 A.2d 897 (N.H. 1962).
43. 104 N.H. 100, 179 A.2d 286 (1962), rehearing denied, 180 A.2d 827 (N.H. 1962).
44. "As we read the opinions in Baker . . . and Scholle . . . the issue presented
by cases such as the one before us is whether an existing system of representation may
be thought to rest upon rational considerations and permissible classification. [This
system is] 'not without rational basis'. . . ." Id. at 827.
45. N.H. CONST. Pt. II, arts. 25, 26. The rationale of such a system is of course
that those who pay the greatest percentage in taxes should have the greatest say as to
how the money is spent.
46. 182 A.2d at 899.
47. The court concluded the Maynard decision with these words: "... [W]e
cannot say that [our apportionment system] is without rational basis or that it has
produced an unrepresentative selection for the upper house of the Legislature." 182
A.2d at 900.
48. Perhaps the case of Sincock v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1962) should
also be included as one in which the suggestion was made that population is the standard
of the equal protection clause in apportionment controversies. The Delaware apportion-
ment formula is one of geographical area for both houses. D.. COST. art. 2, § 2. The
court thought that Baker had addressed itself to the problem of whether a state may
apportion on the area basis rather than on that of population. Clearly, this was not the
NOTES
The Supreme Court decision in Baker in no manner altered these tradi-
tional standards; there is not the slightest intimation by any Justice that
the equal protection clause requires that systems of apportionment be
based upon such a standard. Indeed the Court expressly held in the
earlier case of McDougal v. Green49 that the equal protection clause does
not require the examination of state laws by such a standard and three
Justices specifically called attention to that fact in their Baker opinions."0
The court in MacDougal proclaimed:
To assume that political power is a function exclusively of
numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government. Thus
the Constitution protects the interests of the smaller against the
greater by giving in the Senate entirely unequal representation
to populations. It would be strange indeed and doctrinare, for
this Court, applying such broad constitutional concepts as due
process and equal protection of the laws, to deny a State the
power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as
between its thinly populated counties and those having concen-
trated masses. . . . The Constitution-a practical instrument
of government-makes no such demands on the States."
It would appear, then, that state and lower federal courts in an attempt
to see state assemblies selected upon the admittedly justifiable basis of
population have stretched the proscription of the equal protection clause
by the implantation of a more strict standard than that traditionally
employed to determine violations of that guarantee.
Two courts in considering three apportionment cases since Baker
have determined that there is one overriding standard for finding viola-
tions of the equal protection clause: Does an apportionment system pro-
duce invidious discrimination?" To resolve this question, they have
constructed a "test for invidiousness" comprised in substance of the
following questions: (1) Is the basis of the prevailing system of appor-
tionment rational? (2) Is the system arbitrary?" (3) Does the system
issue before the Supreme Court in Baker. The court concluded its opinion with the
remark that it would stay any judicial action "in the hope and expectation that some
appropriate action may be taken by the General Assembly." Id. at 206. It seems clear
that had not the court felt that the area standard violated the equal protection clause
it would not have expressed a hope for legislative action.
49. 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
50. 369 U.S. at 251-52, 265-66, 334.
51. 335 U.S. at 283-84.
52. W.M.C.A. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal docketed, No.
460, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3132 (1962) ; Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962),
appeal docketed, No. 112, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3013 (1962) ; Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp.
248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
53. The Sittow case combined factors one and two.
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have an historical basis in the state's past? (4) Do the people of the state
have a political remedy at their disposal by which the malapportionment
could be corrected? (5) Is there a clear violation of a constitutional
guarantee by the system? (6) Is the system based upon considerations
of geography or inaccessibility to the polls?" As stated by the court in
Sanders v. Gray, "The test is the sum of all of these factors . . . giving
due regard to each. .... 5
This "test," it is submitted, has little to commend it, for it, in effect,
waters down the traditional equal protection standards of rationality and
arbitrariness by including with them factors which in no way aid in
discovering substantive violations of that guarantee, i.e., considerations
of history, remedy and clarity of violation. If an apportionment system
is irrational, it matters not how long the state has operated under it.
Long recognition and use do not imply rationality. Moreover, the fact
that a state's electorate have a non-judicial remedy for relief from
malapportionment does not render the system any less rational or arbitrary
than it is in fact. The standards of rationality and arbitrariness address
themselves only to the nature of state law and do not comprehend con-
siderations of justiciability. Whether the people of a state have a political
remedy should therefore not be considered as a part of the test for
invidiousness, but rather as a requirement to the justiciability of the
malapportionment claim presented.5"
There have been but three courts since Baker that have determined
apportionment controversies according to the traditional standards of the
equal protection clause."r In all of these cases the plaintiff's attack was
54. Only the Sinon case included this criterion.
55. 203 F. Supp. at 170.
56. This is no doubt what Mr. Justice Clark contemplated when he prefaced his cau-
tionary remarks about the existence of another remedy with the following: "Although I
find [that] the .Tennessee apportionment statute offends the Equal Protection Clause, I
would not consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if there were any other
relief available to the people of Tennessee." Ibid.
57. To these cases must now be added Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla.
1962) and Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962) both of which have
appeared subsequent to the completion of this note.
The Florida federal court has more clearly adhered to the traditional standards of
the equal protection clause than any other court that has considered apportionment
since Baker. In an opinion rendered July 23, 1962 the court found that Florida's
apportionment statutes were invidiously discriminatory because of the lack of a rational
basis. 208 F. Supp. at 318. Subsequently, on August 1, 1962 the state legislature met and
adopted a constitutional amendment proposal and two apportionment statutes to implement
the former. The forty-six member senate is now composed of legislators elected from as
many districts, some of which are single counties and some of which are grouped counties.
The house is comprised of one representative from each of Florida's counties with addi-
tional representatives on the basis of population. In upholding the above legislation
the court followed these criteria: "It is not required that . . . either or both houses
of a bicameral legislature must be apportioned upon a population basis of either exact or
approximate equality of representation. It is only when the discrimination is invidious
NOTES
leveled not at the results of legislative inaction, but rather at state appor-
tionment formulas which deviated from the population basis.
When the Baker case was considered on remand by the Tennessee
federal court, because that state's legislature had passed new apportion-
ment statutes, the parties stipulated to consider their constitutionality
only. In its decision the court perused the Supreme Court's opinion for
the applicable standards and established the following criterion for de-
terming violations of the equal protection clause: "Do the statutes
establish classifications predicated upon a rational basis, or are they utterly
arbitrary and lacking in rationality?""8 There could be no clearer ac-
ceptance of the Supreme Court's intimations for testing the constitu-
tionality of apportionments. The Tennessee federal court correctly
interpreted the high Court's position and followed with an application of
the traditional standards. 9
The Idaho constitution provides for lower house membership de-
termined by the allotment of one representative per county and additional
representatives for those counties having populations in excess of a
legislatively established ratio.6" In Caesar v. Williams6 the Idaho court
noted that there were significant disparities between the population of
state legislative districts but the court determined that these disparities
were created by the application of the state constitutional formula.
Further, the court found that the district population disparities were
rational because the interests of the state were best subserved by alloting
greater representation to its sparsely settled areas than they would receive
by a strict population standard. 2 The court made it abundantly clear that
it did not feel compelled on the authority of Baker to consider as relevant
the results of a rational system. The system being rational and justifiable
or lacking in rationality that it clashes with the Equal Protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 321.
That the Colorado federal court has followed the traditional standards has been
pointed out in note 16 supra.
58. 206 F. Supp. at 345.
59. The 1962 statute which apportioned the Tennessee lower house resulted in
numerical inequalities because every county and floterial district was allowed a single
representative if it had two-thirds of the population ratio. The court found this system
rational, nevertheless, there being "no basis for holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
precludes a state from enforcing a policy which would give a measure of protection
and recognition to its less populous government units." Id. at 346. The court did find
the senate apportionment plan, which created thirty-three districts each of which
would elect one senator, "devoid of any standard or rational plan of classification. .. ."
Ibid. The senate districts were neither equally populated, equal in area, nor comprised
of the same number of counties. More importantly, there were gross horizontal disparities
between like counties.
60. IDAro CoNsT. art. 3, § 4.
61. 371 P.2d 241 (Idaho 1962).
62. Id. at 247-48.
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the court held that the guarantee of the equal protection clause was
satisfied.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has reached the same result. In
Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes3 the court upheld
that state's federal plan of legislative apportionment, by which the lower
house was apportioned substantially by population and the upper house
composed of one delegate from each of Maryland's counties, solely upon
the ground that such a system is rational. The court held that "no more
natural or logical basis could be suggested than that the viable and long
established political subdivisions be accorded representation.. ,,.
This court also was not concerned with the disparities and inequalities
that result from a rational apportionment system.
It can thus be concluded that of the many apportionment contro-
versies reported since the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, all
but three have gone beyond the traditional standards of the equal pro-
tection clause suggested by the Baker decision, some in an apparent effort
to read into that clause the court's own notion of what is and what is not
a democratic system of legislative apportionment. The Baker decision
does not require courts to choose between competing theories of repre-
sentation and hold that apportionment systems need be based upon the
population standard. It has long been a fundamental constitutional tenet
that the equal protection clause will not be deemed violated by a naked
showing of discrimination or inequality, but in the area of legislative
apportionment that tenet is fast becoming a dead letter.
INDIANA'S PRESENT APPORTIONMENT STATUS
It would be an idle review of familiar learning to here present a
complete history of Indiana apportionment, but a few relevant facts must
be set forth so that the reader can fully comprehend the impact which
63. 184 A.2d 715 (Md. 1962). This case knocked around Maryland courts for some
time prior to the rendering of this decision. In an earlier opinion, Maryland Committee
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962), the court of
appeals reversed an order of the lower court sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint
since the Supreme Court had rendered its Baker decision after the trial court's ruling. The
high court instructed the trial court that "inquiry into the rational basis for such
apportionment seems to be called for." Id. at 669. On remand the lower court found
the Maryland constitutional provisions valid, and the appellate court affirmed that
opinion per curiam. Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 182 A.2d
877 (Md. 1962). The most recent decision sets forth the reasons for the per curiam
order. It is possible that the Maryland courts have not seen the last of this litigation
since it is presently on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. No. 610, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3197 (1962).
64. Id. at 719.
254
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it is anticipated Baker will have on Indiana.6"
Article IV of the Indiana constitution declares it the duty of the
General Assembly each six years to make an enumeration of the state's
adult male inhabitants and to reapportion the state on the basis of that
enumeration.66 These constitutional provisions do not expressly stipulate
that the apportionment be made according to population, but the Indiana
Supreme Court as early as 1892 held that to be the constitutional
dcfrective.7 That construction has been continuously accepted, as appor-
tionment statutes which have failed to satisfy the population standard
have been declared unconstitutional." In no case has the court's con-
struction of the constitution been explicated in other than general
language, but it can no doubt be explained by the fact that "population"
and "voter population" have long been considered synonymous in this
realm, and at the time when Indiana's constitutional provisions were
construed the adult male was the only voter. 9
The General Assembly has refused since 1927 to reapportion the
state according to the mandatory provisions of the constitution and
before the Baker decision it was felt that the legislature was well shielded
from a judicial compulsion of their constitutional duty."0 Reasons cited
for this failure have been the desire by a single party to perpetuate its
65. For more complete data on Indiana's apportionment past see, Note, Reapportion-
inent of the Indiana Legislature: Judicial Compidsion of Legislative Duty, 32 IND. L.J.
489 (1957) ; Hamilton, Beardsley, Coats, Legislative Reapportionment in Indiana: Some
Observations and a Suggestion, 35 NoTR DAmE LAW. 368 (1960) ; Seltzer, Rotten
Boroughism in Indiana, 1952 (unpublished thesis in Indiana University Library).
66. IND. CoNsr. art. 4, §§ 2, 4, 5, 6 provide:
The Senate shall not exceed fifty, nor the House of Representatives one
hundred members; and they shall be chosen by the electors of the respective
counties or districts into which the State may, from time to time, be divided.
The General Assembly shall, at its second session after the adoption of this
constitution, and every sixth year thereafter, cause an enumeration to be made
of all the male inhabitants over the age of twenty-one years.
The number of Senators and Representatives shall, at the session next
following each period of making such enumeration, be fixed by law, and ap-
portioned among the several counties, according to the number of male in-
habitants, above twenty-one years of age, in each ...
A Senatorial or Representative District, when more than one county shall
constitute a district, shall be composed of contiguous counties; and no county,
for Senatorial apportionment, shall ever be divided.
67. Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836 (1892).
68. See Denny v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 403, 42 N.E. 929 (1896) ; Fesler v.
Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N.E. 37 (1898) ; Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70
N.E. 980 (1904).
69. Women did not obtain the right of suffrage until the adoption of the seventeenth
amendment, May 31, 1913.
70. The apportionment statutes by which representation is presently determined
were passed in 1921. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 34-101 to -104 (Burns 1956). Since the con-
stitution mandates legislative action every six years no default in the duty to reapportion
occurred until 1927.
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control over the assembly, the failure of the state's enumeration system
to provide complete information upon which the legislature could act,
public apathy, brevity of legislative sessions, and the drawn out consti-
tutional amendment proceedure.7' No longer can the freedom from
judicial intervention be said to contribute to the legislature's refusal to
obey its mandate. But regardless of the reasons for this disregard by the
legislature of substantial population shifts from rural to urban sectors of
the state, a system of apportionment has been produced that is a mockery
to the state's constitutional requirement of representation based upon
population, and one which fails to provide the voters of Indiana with the
equal protection of the laws.
That inequality and discrimination has been the product of legislative
inaction follows ipso facto from a recognition that 40.4 per cent of the
state's voters can elect a majority to the senate and that the lower house
is controlled by but 34.8 per cent."' Particularized manifestations of the
departure from the state's constitutional philosophy of "one man one vote"
are found by showing how counties of grossly unequal population secure
similar representation in the assembly.7 ' The Parke county house district
with a population of 14,875 sends one representative to the General
Assembly, while Clark county with a population of 62,795 also sends but
one. Translated into terms of voting effectiveness this means that the
vote for representative of a Parke county resident is worth four times
as much as a resident of Clark county. Other counties of much greater
population than Parke but which also send one representative are Miami
(38,000), Hamilton (40,132), Bartholomew (48,198), Floyd (51,397)
and Monroe (59,225). It is equally noteworthy that some counties
which have a greater population than Parke do not send even a single
representative to the legislature but share one with a neighboring county
or counties in a floterial district. This would be true of Harrison
(19,207), Jefferson (24,061), Adams (24,643), Dubois (27,463), and
Jackson (30,556) counties. Similar results obtain in the selection of
senators. While Clay and Parke counties, with a combined district popu-
lation of 39,011, send one senator to the General Assembly, so does
Grant county with 75,741, Elkhart with a population of 106,790, and
Delaware county with 110,938. A vote cast for senator in the Clay-
Parke district is therefore four times as effective as a vote cast by a
resident of Delaware county.
71. See generally the authorities cited in note 68 supra.
72. NATIONAL MuNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM ON LEGISLATIVE APPOTIONIENT
(2d ed. 1962, July 1, 1962 supp.).
73. All of the population figures which follow in the text are taken from the 1960
Federal Census.
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Admittedly Parke county is a "horrible" example, but one is faced
with many similar instances of counties vastly differing in population
which secure approximately equal adjusted total representation. 4 The













St. Joseph 238,614 6.76
But no matter how far out of tune the Indiana apportionment
system is with the state's constitutional formula, before the decision in
Baker it was extremely doubtful that anything could be done extra-
legislatively to rectify the malapportionment. Many attempts to judicially
compel the legislature to reapportion have failed and the one attempt to
have the reapportionment statutes declared unconstitutional which was
successful went unheeded." There are presently two cases pending in
74. Adjusted total representation is a concept devised 'by Mr. justice Harlan, 369
U.S. at 342-44, and is explained as follows: Adjusted total representation is the total
representation that a county has in the General Assembly, which has a lower house of
one hundred members and a senate of fifty. If a county has one house member then it
receives 1/100; if it also has one senator then it would receive 2/100, thereby giving it a
total representation of 3/100 or 3.0. However, when a county shares a legislator with
another county in a floterial district, and these counties have unequal populations, it is
not assumed that the legislator represents equally the interests of both counties. Rather
it is assumed that he represents the two counties according to the relative voting power
of each. For example, LaPorte and Starke counties with respective populations of
95,111 and 17,911 comprise a joint senatorial district. Since Starke county's voting
strength in that district is less than 1/5 that of LaPorte, the "adjusted" senatorial
representation of Starke county is .38 (.19x2), rather than an unadjusted 1 (.5x2).
75. Those attempts to compel reapportionment which have to date been unsuccessful
are Grills v. Hendricks, Civil No. S62-1280, Marion Superior Court No. 5, seeking
to restrain the Secretary of State from accepting Assembly candidate declarations to
the 93d General Assembly; Grills v. Gardner, Civil No. 21159, Johnson Circuit Court,
an action to restrain the Auditor of State from issuing warrants and checks for payment
of salaries and expenses of the 92d Assembly and Grills v. Welsh, Civil No. S62-1985,
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the federal court to assure that the 93rd General Assembly does not fail
to reapportion as did its predecessors. Both suits seek a declaration that
election under the present apportionment statutes would violate the equal
protection clause, while one seeks an at large election or judicial reappor-
tionment should the 93rd session fail to enact an equitable statute."'
Should the 93rd assembly ignore their mandate to reapportion according
to population the outcome of these cases is not difficult to anticipate.
The gross inequality and discrimination produced by the present
apportionment statutes has been demonstrated. But under the traditional
standards of the equal protection clause, which it has been urged should
be utilized by the courts in determining malapportionment controversies,
mere discrimination is insufficient to justify a declaration of unconstitu-
tionality without a finding that the discrimination-producing system lacks
a rational basis. It is only when courts deviate from established standards
and read the requirement of substantial voting equality into the clause that
mere discrimination, albeit rational, runs afoul of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Even applying only the traditional standards to the Indiana appor-
tionment system, however, a violation of the equal protection clause is
clear for it produces not only vertical discrimination, but horizontal
discrimination as well."' Such discrimination is demonstrated by com-
paring the adjusted total representation of like counties. As examples of
discrimination between rural counties consider the following:"8
Marion Superior Court No. 5, an attempt to mandate the State Election Board to reappor-
tion and to restrain the board from supervising local elections of Assembly members.
The one successful case which had gone unheeded was Grills v. Anderson, Civil No.
S59-600, Marion Superior Court No. 5, March 17, 1961. The court declared that the
act apportioning the state legislature was void and without effect because in violation
of Article 4, § 5 of the Indiana constitution, and that any legislature convened under the
present statute would be without de facto authority to enact legislation. No appeal was
taken from this decision. Nevertheless, the 1962 November elections for the General
Assembly were completed under the present statute, and legislators to the 93d Assembly
do not apparently feel that their legislation will be successfully invalidated.
76. These two cases respectively are Grills v. Welsh, Civil No. IP 62-C-326; S.D.
Ind. and Stout v. Hendricks, Civil No. IP 61-C-236, S.D. Ind. These two cases have now
been combined and the litigants given until April 18, 1963 to complete their pleadings.
Thus the federal court will not, as was originally anticipated, consider the merits of the
Indiana situation until after the 93d Assembly has been given an opportunity to cor-
rect the state's malapportionment.
77. See text pp. 8-9 supra. The discussion which follows in the text is based
upon the assumption that the State of Indiana could only hope to justify its present
system of apportionment by asserting that it effectuated a political balance between
urban and rural interests. See supra note 41.
78. In their Baker decisions both Justices Clark and Harlan thought that a county
could be considered "urban" if it contained a municipality in excess of 10,000 population.
It is realized that the mere fact that two counties have no municipality of over 10,000
may be a tenuous criterion for adjudging them "alike" and "rural." But for lack of any




























Discrimination is also present in counties of like population which are


































It therefore is abundantly clear that the Indiana system of legislative
apportionment, when tested by the traditional standard of rationality,
fails to satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause. Counties
which are similar to one another both in population and economic interest
secure dissimilar representation in the state legislature. This should come
as no great shock for surely none would have presumed that the erratic
shifts of population which have occurred in Indiana during the past three
decades would have in some miraculous manner resulted in a uniform















WHAT COURSE FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY?
There are two principal problems which the Indiana General As-
sembly must face regarding reapportionment. First, abiding by judicial
pressure created by the Baker decision, the legislature must pass apportion-
ment statutes which comply with the constitutional requirement of equal
protection. It is not sufficient, however, that the new statutes merely
satisfy the equal protection clause's guarantee, for the Indiana Supreme
Court has never been lax to declare unconstitutional apportionment
statutes which deviate from the state's requirement of a population based
system. 9 Secondly, the legislature must also decide whether to maintain
the present apportionment formula of representation on the basis of
population or pass a constitutional resolution which would establish a new
standard. Both problems are indeed formidable.
That the assembly will attempt to pass new apportionment statutes
cannot be doubted for the federal court will surely take positive action
should this session fail to observe its constitutional duty."0 The problems
which will confront the legislature in this regard will primarily be of a
political nature. That is to say, no legislator from the overrepresented
rural areas will be anxious to lend his support to statutes which will cost
him his assembly seat, nor will members of the political party favored
by the present apportionment system be inclined to adopt a system which
will alter the status quo to their detriment. Thus, despite the threat of
judicial intervention, it would be highly speculative to conclude that the
legislature will be successful in its attempt to reapportion under the present
constitutional standard.81
79. Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836 (1892) ; Denny v.
State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 403, 42 N.E. 929 (1896) ; Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71,
44 N.E. 37 (1898) ; Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904).
80. This conclusion would not necessarily follow should the General Assembly
pass a constitutional resolution which altered the present population standard, for in
such a case the federal court might feel sufficient progress was made to hold judicial
relief in abeyance. But query whether that result would be realistic. The next Assembly
could table its predecessor's resolution (since resolutions must be passed by two con-
secutive Assemblies under IND. CONST. art. 16, § 1) and thus at least two more years
of malapportionment would result
81. There are problems other than the conflict of personal and partisan interests
which the legislature must face in passing constitutional apportionment statutes. Un-
doubtedly the state enumeration requirement will not meet with any more success in the
coming year than it has in the past thirty-five, so the legislature will be unable to abide
by the provision that apportionments be made on the basis of adult males ascertained
by special census. The legislature will undoubtedly resort to federal census figures,
but will it base its reapportionment on the number of adult males, total electors, or total
population? Perhaps that inquiry is purely academic for it is unlikely that anyone
would premise an action on the legislature's failure to abide by enumeration requirements
that are both impractical and antiquated. S.B. 20, 92d Sess. (1961), called for immediate
enumeration of both male and female inhabitants over the age of twenty-one years.
There appears to have been no objection made to such an enumeration on the ground
NOTES
The 93rd General Assembly, it is submitted, will have as difficult
a time agreeing upon a constitutional amendment which alters the present
apportionment formula as it will in passing constitutional apportionment
statutes. In the past, the so-called federal plan systems for apportionment
have received the greatest attention of the legislature and would appear
to have the best possibility of being adopted. 2 Such plans vary greatly
in form.
One possibility is the apportioning of one house solely and in good
faith on the basis of population with the other house composed of one
representative from each of Indiana's ninety-two counties." Such an
apportionment formula, it is submitted, would satisfy the equal protection
clause as a rational system of apportionment, regardless of what may be
said of its political undesirability. 4 Admittedly the system would pro-
duce wide numerical inequality in the number of voters represented by the
legislators of one house, but as it has been asserted above, inequality
without irrationality does not per se violate the equal protection clause.
A system of apportionment whereby the long-established and recognized
political subdivisions of a state are accorded an equal voice in one
legislative chamber would not appear an irrational state policy.8"
Another variation of the federal plan which has been before the
General Assembly in past sessons is that which provides for the non-
population based chamber to be composed of forty-six legislators elected
from districts of two contiguous counties.8 This plan would appear to
have serious constitutional objections if rationalized as balancing urban
and rural interests, for it is perceived that its implementation would
necessarily produce a certain degree of irrational discrimination. In
some instances no doubt a district would be composed of two rural counties
or of two urban counties, but in many other cases rural and urban counties
would comprise districts."' In those districts of unlike counties it is only
reasonable to assume that its legislator would represent the interests of
those who had the greatest hand in his election, viz., the voters in the
urban community. At the same time rural counties which were joined in a
that it failed to comply with the state requirement that only adult males be counted for
apportionment purposes.
82. S.J. Res. 1, 92d Sess. (1961) ; H.J. Res. 2, 92d Sess. (1961) : S.J. Res. 3, 92d
Sess. (1961) ; H.J. Res. 8, 92d Sess. (1961) ; H.J. Res. 18, 92d Sess. (1961).
83. Such a plan was embodied in H. J. Res. 16, 90th Sess. (1957) ; H.J. Res. 2, 92d
Sess. (1961) ; H.J. Res. 10, 92d Sess. (1961).
84. See 35 NonRE DAME LAW., op. cit. supra note 48 at 380-84.
85. Accord, Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 184 A.2d 715
(Md. 1962).
86. H.J. Res. 8, 90th Sess. (1957) ; H.J. Res. 8, 92d Sess. (1961).
87. For example, Allen, Vanderburgh, Tippecanoe and Vigo counties all are urban
and entirely surrounded by rural counties.
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district would select a legislator who naturally would represent the rural
interests of both. Such a system, then, would in no way result in a
balancing of rural-urban interests for it would, as does the present system,
create horizontal and therefore irrational disparities.
But let us not assume that the only rational system of apportionment
other than that of giving all electors an equal vote is one which secures
a political balance between different economic interests. That is, the exist-
ence of horizontal disparities in a system is only productive of unconstitu-
tionality when state justification for that system is premised on the
effectuation of such a balance of interests. The forty-six district plan
could be justified on other rational grounds: The legislature could justifi-
ably deem both retention of one small legislative chamber and the preserva-
tion of long-established county lines essential for the efficient manage-
ment of state and local government.8 "
A third variation of the federal plan, and perhaps the one which
has received the greatest attention in the Indiana legislature, is that by
which the presently existing districts in the senate are made permanent
or "frozen." 9 It is clear that a system of legislative apportionment based
upon that formula would violate the equal protection clause for it would
merely propagate the existing horizontal disparities."0 Such a federal
plan would be as unconstitutional as the present system irrespective of
the fact that its irrationality would be confined to but one of the two
houses.
CONCLUSION
The Indiana General Assembly could not be faced with a clearer
choice; it must either reapportion the state on its own initiative or submit
to a judicial undertaking or compulsion of that duty. Perhaps the United
States Supreme Court felt that after its Baker decision the only avenue
for legislatures such as Indiana's would be to dutifully acknowledge the
Court's policy declaration and voluntarily undertake reapportionment.
It is submitted, however, that despite the Supreme Court's admonition
to inactive legislatures and the lower Indiana federal court's anticipated
intervention into the political arena should the assembly fail to enact
constitutional apportionment statutes, the Indiana legislature will be
88. In Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1961), an analogous system
was upheld even though "alignments of counties have been made with no more logic
than flows from the necessity of creating districts from neighboring counties." Id. at 323.
89. S.J. Res. 1, 90th Sess. (1957) ; S.J. Res. 1, 92d Sess. (1961) ; S.J. Res. 3, 92d
Sess. (1961).
90. This conclusion assumes that the state could only hope to justify such a federal
plan on the ground that it protected the rural areas from injurious underrepresentation.
It is hard to conceive that any other justification could be advanced.
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unable to work out equitable apportionment laws in its 93rd session.
Such inaction will be the result of the legislature's inability to mechanically
dispense with its traditional, and heretofore carefully preserved, practice
of fighting out political differences and arriving at an end only with
conscience seared. Those who view the maintenance of separated govern-
mental branches essential for compliance with the intention of our con-
stitutional founders will sympathize with the legislature's philosophical
position, though perhaps be displeased with the result it produces. But
those who find the amenability of the legislature to the judiciary in
political matters essential for the maintenance of responsible government
will be pleased with the ultimate affect that Baker must have on Indiana.
HAS THE RULE OF MacPHERSON V. BUICK BEEN ADOPTED
IN INDIANA?
Indiana presumably has aligned itself with the majority of other
jurisdictions in the assault on the "citadel of privity." The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, interpreting the law of Indiana
in the case of Elliot v. General Motors Corp.,' recently held that privity
of contract is not a necessary element in order to state a cause of action
against a manufacturer and recover for injuries suffered as a result of
the negligent manufacture of a defective product.
The plaintiff in the Elliot case was employed as an automobile me-
chanic by a Chevrolet distributor. The defendant manufactured and sold
an automobile to the distributor who in turn sold it to a consumer. A
short time later it was taken to the distributor for some minor repairs
which required the plaintiff to loosen certain bolts underneath the auto-
mobile. This necessitated reaching through an opening in a splash shield
designed by the defendant to permit access to the automobile engine by a
mechanic. The opening was defectively formed in that it had a sharp
knife-like edge which was concealed from view. Plaintiff's hand slipped
from a wrench with which he was loosening the bolt, came into contact
with the sharp edge of the opening, and he sustained a severe injury to
his arm.
Assuming negligence, since the appeal arose from the district court's
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, the court postulated the issue as
1. 296 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1961).
